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PACE LAW REVIEW
Volume 20 Spring 2000 Number 2
Symposium Speeches
Liability of Psychiatrists Under New York
Law for Failing to Identify
Dangerous Patients*
Scott Rogge, M.D., J.D.**
I have been asked to give a concise and comprehensive
summary of the liability of therapists' under current New York
* This speech was part of a special program presented on April 8, 1999, by
Pace University School of Law with Albert Einstein College of Medicine Division of
Law and Psychiatry at Pace University School of Law, entitled Playing the
Psychiatric Odds: Can We Protect the Public by Predicting Dangerousness?
** Dr. Rogge is an Assistant Professor of Psychiatry at Albert Einstein Col-
lege of Medicine and Associate Director of the Law and Psychiatry Fellowship Pro-
gram. He currently serves as Director of Psychiatry at North Central Bronx
Hospital and is Associate Chair of the Department of Psychiatry for the North
Bronx Healthcare Network. He is Board-certified in forensic psychiatry and is Di-
rector of the Assisted Outpatient Treatment Program for the Bronx established
under Kendra's Law. Dr. Rogge is a graduate of Albany Medical College (M.D.)
and Rutgers Law School (J.D.).
1. "Therapists" and "clinicians" will herein include licensed mental health
practitioners of various disciplines, including psychiatrists, psychologists, psychi-
atric social workers, or psychiatric nurse clinicians. The Tarasoff opinion uses the
term "therapist." Tarasoffv. Regents of the University of California, 551 P.2d 334,
340 n.2 (Cal. 1976). It has been noted that this is a "broad" term which has paved
the way to arguments by analogy. See Peter F. Lake, Revisiting Tarasoff, 58 ALB.
L. REV. 97, 98 n.6 (1994).
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law for failing to identify dangerous patients. Due to time con-
straints, I will limit my discussion to a therapist's Tarasoff lia-
bility in New York.2
Tarasoff v. Board of Regents of the University of California
is the landmark 1976 California Supreme Court case which fun-
damentally revised the previous law governing therapist re-
sponsibility to third-party victims of their violent patients.3
Prior to Tarasoff, clinicians were not held responsible for the
violent acts of their patients unless they had a special relation-
ship with the patient or the victim. 4 This responsibility was
generally limited to situations where the clinician had physical
control or custody of the patient (such as with an inpatient),
knew in advance of the patient's violent intentions, and failed to
exercise appropriate control.5 In other words, clinicians previ-
ously risked liability for negligently allowing patients with vio-
lent histories and intentions to be released or to escape from
their custody and control when those patients later caused
harm to other people.
This traditional liability risk for clinicians was significantly
expanded by the California Supreme Court in the Tarasoff case
when the court ruled that when a therapist knows or should
know that a patient represents a significant danger to an identi-
fiable third party, the therapist should take reasonable steps to
protect that third party from harm.6
2. Therapists are potentially liable in tort malpractice for failing to identify
dangerous patients in a wide range of clinical circumstances. Examples include
negligent diagnosis or treatment, monitoring or supervision, or discharge or escape
of a dangerous patient. Potential Tarasoff liability only arises in one such clinical
circumstance, when failure to identify a dangerous patient who has threatened to
harm a third party results in actual harm to the intended victim. See Tarasoff v.
Regents of the University of California, 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976). See generally
Ralph Slovenko, Legal Duty of Therapists to Third Parties, PSYCHIATRIC TIMES,
Aug. 1999, at 51.
3. See Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 335.
4. See id. at 343; see also id. at 354-56 (Clark, J., dissenting) (arguing that it is
believed that placing a duty on therapists to disclose patients' threats to potential
victims greatly impairs treatment); see also People v. Burnick, 535 P.2d 352, 365
(Cal. 1975) (en banc) (discussing that psychiatric predictions of violence are inher-
ently unreliable).
5. See Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 344 n.7.
6. See id. at 343.
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Most of you are probably familiar with the facts of this case,
so a brief summary will suffice.7 The Tarasoff case is essentially
an unrequited love story run tragically amuck. Mr. Poddar was
a foreign-born college student who developed a "crush" on an-
other student, Ms. Tarasoff. She did not return his affections,
and instead traveled abroad for a semester. Mr. Poddar became
despondent and entered into therapy at the college counseling
center. During a session, he made an overt threat to kill Ms.
Tarasoff when she returned. The psychologist who was treating
him became justifiably concerned and conferred with his super-
vising psychiatrist. The counseling center notified campus po-
lice by letter and instructed an officer to pick up Mr. Poddar and
bring him to the hospital for involuntary commitment.
The campus police went to Mr. Poddar's house and inter-
viewed him. He did not appear psychotic to them, and he de-
nied that he had any intent to harm Ms. Tarasoff. Based on his
reassurances, the police decided they had no grounds to bring
him to the hospital. The counseling center took no further ac-
tion. The medical director of the clinic, upon returning from va-
cation and learning of the events, instructed his staff to delete
all records of the incident. The counseling center asked the
campus police to return the commitment recommendation letter
that it had sent and obliterated any reference to the events from
the patient's chart.
Two months later Ms. Tarasoff returned from abroad. Mr.
Poddar approached her, but she rejected him once again. In a
fit of anger and confusion Mr. Poddar killed her, then immedi-
ately confessed and turned himself into the police.8 He was
tried and convicted of second degree murder, but his criminal
conviction was overturned on appeal on the grounds that the
trial judge had given inadequate instructions to the jury con-
cerning the defense of diminished capacity.9 He did, however,
serve time for voluntary manslaughter.' 0 Upon release from
prison, he returned to his homeland, married, and at last report
7. See id. See also factual recitations in Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of
Cal., 33 Cal. App. 3d 275 (1973), vacated 529 P.2d 553 (Cal. 1974), vacated 551
P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976).
8. See Poddar, 518 P.2d 342, 345 (1974).
9. See id. at 350.
10. See Alan A. Stone, The Tarasoff Decisions: Suing Psychotherapists to Safe-
guard Society, 90 HARv. L. REV. 358 (1976).
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was living happily ever after.1 The parents of Ms. Tarasoff did
not live so happily ever after. They sued the university, the
campus police, and the therapists involved in this tragedy.
The California Supreme Court actually heard the Tarasoff
case twice. In its first decision, they narrowly and specifically
defined the therapist's duty as a duty to warn in such cases. 12
After a rehearing en banc, the court rendered its second deci-
sion, in which the therapist's duty was redefined as the more
vague duty to protect the intended victim. 13
So what was new about the Tarasoff decision? First of all,
it was not an inpatient discharge case. The violent patient was
an outpatient and hence not in the clinician's custody or control
at the time his threat was made. Second, the responsibility im-
posed upon the therapist by the court was not permissive or dis-
cretionary, allowing that the clinician could warn a potential
victim of threatened violence. In effect, it was a duty which, if
breached, was punishable in tort malpractice by civil monetary
damages. Third, the new duty was rather vague and all encom-
passing. After all, what threats were sufficiently "serious and
imminent"? If not specifically named, when was the threatened
victim "identifiable"? And what were "reasonable steps" for the
therapist to take to protect the party threatened?
Tarasoff-type duties have been recognized in over twenty-
five states either by statute or by case law in the more than
twenty years since the Tarasoff decision was handed down.14
Other jurisdictions have explicitly rejected or limited the appli-
cation of the Tarasoff doctrine. 5 Still other courts have distin-
11. See Stone, supra note 10, at 360-61.
12. See Tarasoff, 529 P.2d 553. This decision is commonly referred to as
Tarasoff I.
13. See Tarasoff, 551 P.2d 334, 340. This decision is commonly referred to as
Tarasoff 11. Many legal experts attribute this to the "outraged reaction" to
Tarasoff L See, e.g., Vanessa Merton, Confidentiality and the 'Dangerous'Patient:
Implications of Tarasoff for Psychiatrists and Lawyers, 31 EMORY L.J. 263, 294
(1982).
14. See Bradley v. Ray, 904 S.W.2d 302 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995) (containing an
excellent discussion of the state of Tarasoff legal developments nationwide). See
also Hembree v. State, 925 S.W.2d 513 (Tenn. 1996); Estates of Morgan v. Fairfield
Family Counseling Ctr., 673 N.E.2d 1311 (Ohio 1997), reconsid. denied, 676
N.E.2d 534 (Ohio 1997); Almonte v. New York Med. College, 851 F. Supp. 34 (D.
Conn. 1994).
15. See, e.g., Thapar v. Zezulka, 994 S.W.2d 635 (Tex. 1999); Green v. Ross,
691 So.2d 542 (Fla. App.1997); Nasser v. Parker, 455 S.E.2d 502 (Va. 1995); Lee v.
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guished Tarasoff in cases based on factual distinctions
presented. 16 Another line of cases has expanded Tarasoffs ap-
plications to new settings, new populations, and new classes of
health providers and other defendants who may be held respon-
sible for an individual's violent conduct. 17
Statutory approaches have been similarly diverse as state
confidentiality and malpractice laws have been amended to
limit, permit, or mandate therapist disclosures in Tarasoff-type
situations, often involving immunity from therapist failure-to-
protect lawsuits in return. 8 Several states have also enacted
derivative statutes extending Tarasoff-type duties to new
classes of professionals in new situations; for example, address-
ing a health care worker's duty to warn third party contacts of
risks of exposure to a patient's transmissible disease (e.g., HIV/
AIDS or active TB).' 9
Corregedore, 925 P.2d 324 (Haw. 1996) (limiting the Tarasoff doctrine to cases in-
volving potential victims of violent assault, while declining to extend it to risks of
self-inflicted injury).
16. See, e.g., Bishop v. South Carolina Dep't of Mental Health, 473 S.E.2d 814
(S.C. App. 1996), affd as modified, 502 S.E.2d 78 (S.C. 1998) (victim had prior
knowledge of patient's dangerousness); Riley v. United Health Care of Harding,
Inc., 165 F.3d 28 (6th Cir. 1998) (patient made non-specific threats); Limon v.
Gonzaba, 940 S.W.2d 236 (Tex. App. 1997) (victims neither identifiable nor
foreseeable).
17. See, e.g., Garamella v. New York Med. College, 23 F. Supp.2d 167 (D.
Com 1998) (psychiatric resident's supervisor sued for failing to notify resident's
medical school that resident was a pedophile); J.S. v. R.T.H., 714 A.2d 924 (N.J.
1998) (spouse had reason to know of her husband's sexually abusive behavior
against neighbor's children); Popple v. Rose, 573 N.W.2d 765 (Neb. 1998) (babysit-
ter's parents sued for failure to warn of their son's known dangerous sexual
propensities); Valentine v. On Target, Inc., 727 A.2d 947 (Md. 1999) (gun dealer
sued); Ludlow v. City of Clifton, 702 A.2d 506 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1997) (school board
and child study team sued); Doe v. McKay, 700 N.E.2d 1018 (Ill. 1998) (recovered
memory case); Cain v. Rijken, 717 P.2d 140 (Or. 1986) (en banc) (driving case). See
also James Beck, CONFIDENTIALITY VERSUS THE DuTY TO PROTECT: FORESEEABLE
HARM IN THE PRACTICE OF PSYCHIATRY (James C. Beck ed., 1990); Leon
VandeCreek & Samuel Knapp, TARAsoFF AND BEYOND: LEGAL AND CLINICAL CON-
SIDERATIONS IN THE TREATMENT OF LIFE-ENDANGERING PATIENTS (rev. ed. 1993).
See generally Michael L. Perlin, Tarasoff at the Millenium: New Directions, New
Defendants, New Dangers, New Dilemmas, PSYCHIATRIC TIMES, Nov. 1999, at 20.
18. See, e.g., Hutchinson v. Patel, 637 So.2d 415 (La. 1994). See generally
Michael R. Geske, Note, Statutes Limiting Mental Health Professionals' Liability
for the Violent Acts of Their Patients, 64 IND. L.J. 391 (1989).
19. See Lawrence 0. Gostin & James G. Hodge, Jr., Piercing the Veil of Se-
crecy in HIVIAIDS and Other Sexually Transmitted Diseases: Theories of Privacy
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I am going to limit my discussion to New York's reaction to
the Tarasoff decision. New York, like many other states, has
responded to the case by passing a Tarasoff exception to its pa-
tient-therapist confidentiality laws. 20 This Tarasoff exception
was passed in 1984 as an amendment to the section of the
Mental Hygiene Law governing the confidentiality of clinical
records. It appears to give clinicians permission to release rele-
vant medical records, and presumably their contents, in
Tarasoff-type situations without the risk of being sued for vio-
lating the state's confidentiality laws. In the words of the
statute:
[UInformation about patients or clients... reported to... [OMH
licensed or operated facilities] shall not be released ... except as
follows: to an endangered individual and a law enforcement
agency when a treating psychiatrist or psychologist has deter-
mined that a patient or client presents a serious and imminent
danger to that individual. The reasons for any such disclosures
shall be fully documented in the clinical record. Nothing in this
paragraph shall be construed to impose an obligation upon a
treating psychiatrist or psychologist to release information pursu-
ant to this paragraph.21
But note these caveats. First, the confidentiality provision and
its exception only expressly apply to New York State Office of
Mental Health [OMHI operated or licensed facilities. Most psy-
chiatric hospitals and clinics are in fact licensed by OMH. How-
ever, what about patients and therapists in non-OMH facilities,
such as many substance abuse,22 Department of Corrections, or
Office of Veteran Affairs ("VA") clinics? Does it apply to those in
private practice?
Second, the Tarasoff exception to the confidentiality statute
only expressly applies to treating psychiatrists and psycholo-
gists, but does not mention other psychotherapists. Does it in
fact apply to other mental health providers treating patients
more and more in the era of managed care, such as psychiatric
and Disclosure in Partner Notification, 5 DuKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 9, 41-44
(1998).
20. See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 33.13(c)(6) (McKinney 1996).
21. Id.
22. Most substance abuse treatment facilities are licensed by the federal Of-
fice of Alcohol and Substance Abuse Services (OASAS).
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social workers or nurse clinicians? What about non-treating cli-
nicians, such as supervisors?
Third, the statutory provision gives permission for a
Tarasoff-type disclosure by the therapist, but expressly imposes
no obligation. In a Tarasoff case, would a New York court con-
clude that the legislature intended that there not be a
mandatory Tarasoff duty on clinicians in New York based on
this statute?
Fourth, the situation overriding the patient's confidential-
ity and justifying the disclosure of the threat by the clinician is
very narrowly defined. The statutory exception applies only
when the treating therapist has determined that the patient
presents a "serious and imminent danger" to "an endangered
individual." What happens in less imminent situations, or
when threats are made to specific groups rather than individu-
als? Does strict confidentiality still prevail and prohibit
disclosure?
The statute permits a Tarasoff warning to "an endangered
individual" or "a law enforcement agency" such as the police in
such situations. But what if the clinician feels that other pro-
tective steps are clinically preferable? Does the clinician in ef-
fect lose the protective effect of the statute?
And finally, in clinical situations arising outside the narrow
limits of the statute, does any independent Tarasoff duty in tort
exist, or does the statute preempt any common law duty on the
therapist to issue a Tarasoff warning?
So far there is only one published decision that has been
handed down in New York which has applied this Tarasoff stat-
utory exception to a clinical situation, and it is not very helpful
in answering these questions. Oringer v. Rotkin23 is an Appel-
late Division case decided in 1990. The plaintiff had been a psy-
chiatric patient at a state hospital outpatient clinic for five
years, and was being treated by the defendant, a clinical psy-
chologist. During a therapy session, the patient threatened to
kill one of his son's schoolmates. The therapist took him quite
seriously. He documented in the patient's chart that he consid-
ered this to be a serious and imminent threat. He then dis-
closed the patient's threat to the patient's wife in order to obtain
23. 556 N.Y.S.2d 67 (1st Dep't 1990).
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the name of the threatened child. He relied upon the informa-
tion given by the patient's wife and notified the parents of the
threatened schoolmate.
The irate patient sued his therapist for breach of fiduciary
duty of confidentiality in disclosing his threat to his wife. 24 In
effect, then, Oringer was a reverse Tarasoff case. In Tarasoff,
the threat was made and the therapist did not issue a warning.
When the patient committed the act, the victim's family sued
the therapist. In Oringer, the therapist did issue a warning and
was then sued by the patient for issuing that warning.
The trial court in Oringer dismissed the suit for failure to
state a cause of action. The Appellate Division reinstated the
case only to grant summary judgment to the therapist anyway.
It held that the therapist could not be held liable for breach of
confidentiality as a matter of law under New York's Tarasoff
statutory exception, noting in particular the therapist's compli-
ance with the statutory requirements in the way he made and
documented his disclosure.
While this case may make many therapists breathe a sigh
of relief, it should be noted that the facts clearly fell within the
very narrow bounds of the statutory exception. The therapist
was a treating psychologist, and worked for an OMH operated
facility. There was no dispute about the threat or its serious
and imminent nature, and the therapist followed the statute to
the letter and documented the basis for his disclosure. In fact,
the only variance from the statute was that the therapist spoke
to the patient's wife instead of to the police or the intended vic-
tim, and he only did that in order to ascertain the name of the
intended victim. Thus, this case gives us little guidance in ad-
dressing the many unanswered questions raised by the statu-
tory exception.
In conclusion, a fair summary of a therapist's Tarasoff lia-
bility under current New York law for the violent acts of their
patients is that it remains uncertain over twenty years after the
Tarasoff ruling. On the one hand, the good news for therapists
is that there is no mandatory Tarasoff duty imposed on ther-
24. Plaintiff initially based her cause of action on a breach of CPLR 4507.
This is a rule of evidence and does not give rise to a cause of action. The court
stated that the facts alleged made out a cause of action for a breach of fiduciary
duty of confidentiality. See id. at 68.
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apists by statute or by case law in New York. Psychiatrists in
OMH facilities are even protected by a specific statutory excep-
tion to the confidentiality laws from being held liable for a
breach of confidentiality when confronting a Tarasoff situation,
if they exercise professional discretion and issue a Tarasoff
warning (at least where their patient presents a clearly serious
and imminent danger to a specific individual).
On the other hand, the bad news is that the Tarasoffstatu-
tory exception offers no protection or guidance to therapists in
the most common Tarasoff situations they face every day in
their clinical work. One common situation of concern is when a
therapist concludes, after evaluating a potentially violent pa-
tient, that there is a chronic longer-term risk of violence but no
"serious and imminent" danger to others. If the therapist fails
to issue a Tarasoff warning and violence occurs, the therapist
may be sued for failure to warn or protect. Another common
situation, perhaps of less concern, is where the therapist's as-
sessment concludes that a serious and imminent danger exists
and a warning is issued to a threatened victim, but a bad out-
come results anyway. The therapist may still be sued for not
making additional interventions to protect the victim.
Over two decades since the seminal and controversial
Tarasoff decision, New York State clinicians still find them-
selves in a clinical and medicolegal quagmire in Tarasoff situa-
tions. During these twenty years, Tarasoff has been observed
more and more commonly by therapists in clinical practice, to
the point where it has arguably become the de facto standard of
care in the mental health community in spite of the absence of
clarifying statutory or case law. Hopefully the extent and limits
of this potential new duty will be clearly elucidated in the years
ahead so that therapists can proceed with more confidence and
correctness in their work of helping patients avoid Tarasoff-
type situations in the first place.
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